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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the International Great Depression in
the U.S. and Western Europe by applying the business cycle account-
ing method to a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with
time-varying production e¢ ciency and factor market distortions. We
measure the size of labor and capital market distortions with endoge-
nous factor utilization and their relative importance in accounting for
output uctuation during the interwar period. Our main ndings are
that labor market distortions accounted for two-thirds of the output
drops in both the U.S. and Western Europe, endogenous factor uti-
lization amplied the negative e¤ects of labor market distortions, and
government spending played an important role in the recovery from
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the Great Depression in European countries who left the Gold Stan-
dard in the early 1930s.
JEL Classications: E13; E32; N10
Keywords: International Great Depression; Business Cycle Accounting;
Market Distortions; Factor Utilization; Total Factor Productivity
1 Introduction
In this paper, we analyze the interwar Great Depressions in the U.S. and
Western Europe during the 1929-38 period using a variation of the business
cycle accounting method a la Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (CKM 2007).
We incorporate endogenous capital utilization which disentangles the uc-
tuations of capacity utilization from disturbances in productivity e¢ ciency.
Doing so, we quantify the importance of labor and capital market distor-
tions and production ine¢ ciencies to o¤er new insights into the economic
performance of Western Europe and the U.S. in the interwar period. We nd
that labor market distortions are the main sources of the Great Depressions
in both the U.S. and Western Europe, and that endogenous capital utiliza-
tion amplies their depressing e¤ects in both economies. We also nd that
increases in government spending played an important role in the recovery
from the Great Depression in European countries that left the Gold Standard
in the early 1930s while countries that remained in the Gold Standard were
hindered from recovery by further deterioration in labor market distortions.
The research on the International Great Depression (IGD) received wide
attention after the recent Great Recession of 2008 since the depression of
the 1930s was the largest worldwide economic crisis in terms of severity and
broadness before the 2008 nancial meltdown.1 Despite eight decades of
research on the IGD, there is still little consensus on its source and ampli-
cation mechanism. The literature on IGD can be split into two main strands
based on their proposed origin. The rst strand maintains that the mone-
tary contraction in the United States is at the heart of the Great Depression.
Specically, the U.S. monetary contraction in 1928 aimed to stem the stock
1Several studies focus on the di¤erences in the magnitude between the two crises and
the responses of policy makers (Almunia, Benetrix, Eichengreen, ORourke and Rua 2010,
Crafts and Fearon 2010, Grossman and Meissner 2010) while others compare the causes
of both crises (Temin 2010, Bordo and James 2009, Bordo and Landon-Lane 2010).
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market boom and prevent a gold outow caused a rise in interest rates and
deation, which was exported to the rest of the world due to the Gold Stan-
dard (Eichengreen 1992). The literature identied two channels through
which worldwide deation led to the IGD: labor market distortions caused
by nominal wage rigidity (Eichengreen and Sachs 1985, Newel and Symons
1988, Bernanke and Carey 1996) and capital market distortions caused by
debt deation and nancial crises (Fisher 1933, Bernanke 1983, Bernanke
and James 1991).
The second strand of literature on the IGD turns to non-monetary shocks.
Cole and Ohanian (1999) show that total factor productivity (TFP) alone can
account for 40 percent of the decline in output between 1929 and 1933 in the
U.S. by using a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
neoclassical growth model.2 This study led to a series of research on the
Great Depressions in various countries using the neoclassical growth model
evaluating the role of TFP.3 Cole, Ohanian and Leung (2005) further study
the IGD in a sample of 17 countries using a DSGEmodel with a signal extrac-
tion problem of monetary and productivity shocks and nd that productivity
shocks explain two-thirds of the drop in output between 1929 and 1933.4 Cole
and Ohanian (2004) and Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2004) construct
DSGE models with labor bargaining and show that the cartelization poli-
cies introduced after 1933 in the U.S. which increased the bargaining power
of workers contributed to the slow recovery. Cole and Ohanian (2013) con-
2Ohanian (2001) further investigates the sources of the TFP drop in the US during the
Great Depression and claims that the loss of organizational capital due to bankruptcies is
the most convincing candidate among others.
3Cole and Ohanian (2002) study the UK interwar depression and show that the drop
in output was due to the decline in the labor input rather than TFP and conclude that
labor market policies were to blame. Amaral and MacGee (2002) study the Canadian
case and show that the TFP slow down can account for more than half of the output
drop during the Great Depression. Beaudry and Portier (2002) show that movements in
inputs in response to a stagnation in investment specic technical progress are su¢ cient
to account for the French Great Depression without relying on declines in TFP. Fisher
and Hornstein (2002) investigate the German case and nd that total factor productivity,
countercyclical real wage shocks and scal policy shocks were all important in accounting
for the Great Depression. Perri and Quadrini (2002) show that trade restrictions and real
wage rigidities are su¢ cient to account for the Great Depression in Italy without changes
in TFP.
4Ritschl and Woitek (2000) and Ahmadi and Ritschl (2009) use VAR and FAVAR
models and also nd that monetary policy shocks play only a modest role in explaining
the decline of real activities in the U.S.
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struct a monetary DSGE model with productivity shocks, monetary shocks
and cartelization policies to assess the performance of 18 countries during
the IGD and nd that cartelization policies account for a substantial portion
of the Depressions in the countries that adopted signicant anti-competitive
policies.
In order to analyze the IGD, we collect data of output, consumption,
investment and total hours worked for Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the U.S.5
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the rst to construct such an exten-
sive dataset for the interwar period and conduct business cycle accounting for
the IGD.6 The business cycle accounting method can be described as follows.
First, a competitive equilibrium in a prototype neoclassical growth model is
dened. Next, wedges in equilibrium conditions, namely e¢ ciency, gov-
ernment, investment, and labor wedges, are computed using macroeconomic
data.7 Finally, the model is simulated to quantify the impact of each wedge
on the business cycle.
In this paper we conduct the business cycle accounting exercise within
a closed-economy framework focusing on the roles played by distortions in
domestic markets. This does not mean that we ignore the importance of
transmissions of shocks across countries during this period. The strength
of the business cycle accounting method is that it does not limit the analy-
sis to selected shocks but instead it identies the channels through which
the important disturbances operate.8 We believe that this method comple-
ments existing studies such as Cole, Ohanian and Leung (2005) and Cole and
5One of the challenges for business cycle analysis of the IGD is data availability during
the interwar period. For instance, Cole and Ohanian (2013) had to drop 11 out of 18
countries from their sample for the quantitative analysis due to the availability of consistent
employment and capital stock data. Among the data we use, total hours worked, especially
hours worked per worker, is the most di¢ cult to obtain.
6The original CKM (2007) uses business cycle accounting to study the U.S. Great
Depression. There are also recent studies such as Pensieroso (2011) and Bridji (2013)
which use the business cycle accounting method to investigate the Great Depressions in
Belgium and France individually.
7E¢ ciency wedges are disturbances to the production process, government wedges are
disturbances in the resources available to private agents, investment wedges are distortions
in the capital market, and labor wedges are distortions in the labor market.
8In order to explicitly understand the roles played by international capital markets
during the IGD, we need an open economy framework such as the capital ow accounting
method of Ohanian, Restrepo-Echavarria and Wright (2018).
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Ohanian (2013) by painting a broader picture of the IGD.
We make one important modication to the original CKM (2007) model
which is to disentangle the uctuation of factor utilization from disturbances
in production e¢ ciency. We do so by incorporating endogenous capital uti-
lization following Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988).9 This is im-
portant because a model with constant factor utilization is likely to overstate
the uctuation of production e¢ ciency and understate the e¤ects of other
distortions. Within our model distortions in the factor markets a¤ect output
not only through the quantity of inputs, but also through their e¤ects on
capital utilization giving them a fairer shot in accounting for the IGD.
Our quantitative results o¤er both evaluation of existing theories in the
literature as well as new insights into the initial output decline and the re-
covery phase of the IGD. In terms of the initial phase of the IGD, we nd
that labor wedges are important in accounting for the output drop in the
U.S. and Europe. This supports the empirical results pointing to labor mar-
ket rigidities and the deationary pressure as the main culprits of the IGD.
It also shows that the original conclusion of CKM (2007) that models with
frictions manifested primarily as investment wedges cannot account for the
U.S. Great Depression holds for Europe as well. Our nding new to the liter-
ature is that endogenous capital utilization accounts for a signicant amount
of the uctuation in total factor productivity which dwarfs e¢ ciency wedges
and amplies the depressing e¤ects of labor wedges. For the recovery phase,
we nd that in the U.S. e¢ ciency wedges alone would have led to a much
faster recovery while labor wedges prevented that. This result is consistent
with CKM (2007) even with endogenous capital utilization and supports the
nding of Cole and Ohanian (1999, 2004, 2013) that government policies in-
creasing labor bargaining power hindered U.S. recovery. Furthermore, the
improvement in government wedges contributed to the recovery of the coun-
tries who left the Gold Standard during the early 1930s while the further
deterioration in labor wedges hindered the recovery of the countries that re-
mained on the Gold Standard till the mid-1930s. We also nd that while
the IGD was mainly driven by labor wedges, the recent Great Recession was
mainly driven by e¢ ciency wedges.
The remainder of the paper is constructed as follows. In section 2, we re-
9CKM (2007) provides a sensitivity analysis assuming hours worked per worker as the
utilization rate of capital. Cavalcanti et al (2008) incorporates endogenous capital uti-
lization into the business cycle accounting framework as an observable variable to directly
compute the investment wedges in Argentina.
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view the literature on labor and capital market distortions during the IGD. In
section 3, we describe the business cycle accounting model with endogenous
factor utilization. In section 4, we present the quantitative results. Section
5 concludes the paper.
2 The International Great Depression andMar-
ket Distortions
2.1 Business Cycle Features in the Interwar Period
The Great Depression has been increasingly considered a global phenomenon
not only because it a¤ected many countries, but also because of the global
character of its transmission mechanism. In order to discuss the economic
situation in the world during the interwar period, we construct a unique data
set of output, consumption, investment, and labor for 12 Western European
countries and compare it to the U.S. economy. Due to data availability,
the sample European countries are limited to Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and
the UK.10
Figure 1 presents the log deviations of detrended per capita output, con-
sumption, investment and labor in the U.S. and Europe from their 1929
level.11 For Europe we present the population weighted average. In the U.S.,
output fell dramatically by approximately 0:443 in terms of detrended log dif-
ferences (or 35:8%) between 1929 and 1933. Consumption, investment and
labor all collapsed along with output by 0:302, 1:176 and 0:498 (or 26:1%,
69:2%, and 39:2% respectively). All variables show recovery after 1933, how-
ever, none of them return to their 1929 level by 1938. In Europe, output hits
10Output, consumption, investment and labor represent GDP, private consumption,
domestic gross capital formation and total hours worked respectively. One of the challenges
for business cycle analysis of the IGD is data availability during the interwar period. For
instance, Cole and Ohanian (2013) had to drop 11 out of 18 countries from their sample
for the quantitative analysis due to the availability of consistent employment and capital
stock data. Among the data we use, consistent data of total hours worked, especially
hours worked per worker, is the most di¢ cult to obtain and we make best use of what is
available. The sources of the data series are listed in the data appendix.
11Output, consumption and investment are detrended by the long run per capita output
growth rate over the 1900-2008 period. Labor is not detrended because total hours worked
per capita is considered a mean stationary variable.
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its trough in 1932 where the detrended log di¤erence between the 1929 and
1932 level is 0:169 (or 15:6%). Consumption, investment and labor also fall
by 0:079, 0:545 and 0:161 (or 7:6%, 42:0%, and 14:8% respectively) during
this period. While output, investment and labor show recovery after 1932,
consumption keeps falling throughout the 1930s.
7
Figure 1. Interwar Business Cycle Data in the U.S. and Europe
Numerous research (Choudhri and Kochin 1980, Eichengreen and Sachs
1985, Temin 1989, Newel and Symons 1988, Bernanke and James 1991,
8
Eichengreen 1992, Bernanke and Carey 1996) concluded that the IGD had its
roots in the interwar Gold Standard (often called gold exchange standard) as
a transmission mechanism of deationary policies and argue that labor and
capital markets operated as channels through which worldwide deation led
to output drops. Figure 2 plots the ination rate in the U.S. and Europe
showing that they were facing substantial drops in prices during the IGD.12
While both economies did indeed experience massive deationary pressures
in the early1930s, the ination rate turned positive by the mid-1930s. In the
following sub-sections, we will review the literature focusing on distortions
in factor markets.
Figure 2. Ination in Wholesale Prices in the U.S. and Europe
2.2 The Capital Market
In January 1928, in response to gold outows to France and to curb the stock
market boom, the U.S. chose to embark a contractionary monetary policy
(Hamilton 1987). The policy discount rates increased from 3.8 percent in
1927 to 4.5 percent in 1928 and further to 5.2 percent in 1929. In order to
12The European ination rate is the sum of individual ination rates weighted by the
output shares of each country.
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maintain the gold parity, other countries of the Gold Standard followed the
U.S. contractionary monetary policy.
The role played by deation in the capital market depends on whether
it was well anticipated or not. When the deation is anticipated, it will in-
crease the ex-ante real interest rate and depress aggregate demand if nominal
interest rates did not fully absorb the deationary shock due to perhaps pas-
sive monetary policy (Friedman and Schwartz 1963) and/or the zero lower
bound of nominal interest rates (Eggertson 2012).13 On the other hand, when
the deation is unanticipated, the ex-post real interest rate turns out to be
higher than the ex-ante rate, which creates di¢ culties for debtors to honor
their debts leading to bankruptcies, deterioration in bank balance sheets,
bank runs and bank failures (Bernanke 1983, Hamilton 1987, Bernanke and
James 1991).14
Figure 3 presents the real interest rates in the U.S. and Western Europe
computed as the nominal policy discount rate minus the subsequent years
realized ination rate.15 In both economies real interest rates increased dra-
matically in the late 1920s reecting the deation during this period. After
peaking in 1930, the real interest rates fell dramatically and returned to
their 1925 levels by 1933 whereas it took much longer for investment and
consumption to recover in both economies as shown in Figure 1. Therefore,
whether the deation was anticipated or not, it seems di¢ cult to claim that
13Chadha and Dimsdale (1999) shows that nominal interest rates were not responsive
to changes in the ination rate during the 1920-1938 period in the UK, the U.S., France
and Germany.
14There is a substantial body of literature analyzing the causes of the banking crisis
during the Great Depression. The focus in the literature has been whether bank fail-
ures were caused by illiquidity or insolvency (Richardson 2007). Calomiris and Mason
(2003a) nd that fundamentals  both the attributes of individual banks and the exoge-
nous shocks that a¤ected their health  had close links with the likelihood of US bank
failures over the 1930 to 1933 period. There is also a substantial body of research on
the role of central banks, bank regulation, and bank structure on propagation of banking
crisis during the Great Depression such as Grossman (1994), Mitchener (2005), Mitchener
(2007), Richardson and Troost (2009), Carlson and Mitchener (2009).
15For instance the real interest rate q in year t is
qt = Rt   (lnPt+1   lnPt)
where R is the nominal policy discount rate and P is the wholesale price index. The real
interest rate for Europe is an average of individual country rates weighted by the output
shares of each country.
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the deation caused the real interest rates to depress the aggregate demand
during the IGD.
Figure 3. Real Interest Rates in the U.S. and Europe
Since the real interest rate presented above is the riskless policy rate,
it may not exactly represent the cost of capital. Bernanke (1983) focuses
on the cost of credit intermediation between lenders and certain classes of
borrowers, which includes screening, monitoring, and accounting costs, as
well as the expected losses inicted by bad borrowers, as a key indicator
of nancial distress during the IGD. Hamilton (1987) shows that the U.S.
credit spread between Baa corporate bonds and long term government bonds
rates peaked in 1932 and did not return to its 1925 level until 1936. This
suggests that although the real interest rate was falling the cost of credit
intermediation was rising during the early 1930s and remained higher than
the initial level until later. CKM (2007) shows that credit market frictions
in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of Bernanke, Gertler and
Gilchrist (1999) operate as distortionary taxes on investment, i.e., investment
wedges.
Temin (1976) considers pessimism as the source of the Great Depression
and claims that the decline in money stock was due to the endogenous de-
crease in the demand for money during the U.S. Great Depression. Harrison
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and Weder (2006) take this idea further and construct a dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium model with sunspot shocks estimated as the non-
fundamental shocks to the credit spread between Baa and Aaa bonds. They
nd that pessimistic animal spirits which cause a collapse in investment de-
mand can quantitatively account for the depth of the U.S. Great Depression
and its slow recovery. We show in the appendix that expectational shocks to
future output operate as distortionary taxes on capital income, i.e., invest-
ment wedges.
Next, we focus on the circulation of money. Table 1 presents the growth
rates of money during the IGD.16 This table shows that the decline in money
circulation in Germany and the U.S. experienced a larger drop in money
circulation than in the other countries. In the U.S., the waves of bank fail-
ures beginning in late 1930 led to the nation-wide bank closure by President
Roosevelt in March 1933.17 Friedman and Schwartz (1963) claims that the
banking crisis in the U.S. led to a fall in the supply of money, which in turn
reduced lending and output.18 In Europe, countries also experienced bank-
ing crises, though the banking system was not disrupted as severely as in
the U.S.19 The exception is Germany which experienced a run on banks and
German mark resulting in the failure of Danatbank, the second largest bank
in the country when it went bankrupt in July 1931.20
16We dene money as the sum of central bank issues, deposit in commercial banks and
deposit in savings banks, which corresponds to M2.
17December 1930: failure of Bank of the United States. August to October 1931: a
series of banking panics and failures of 1860 banks. June 1932: a series of bank failures in
Chicago. October 1932: a series of bank failures in Midwest and Far West.
18Temin (1976) argues that the pessimistic expectations of private agents led to the col-
lapse in aggregate demand and that the decline in money stock was due to the endogenous
decrease in the demand for money during the U.S. Great Depression.
19Indeed, according to Bernanke and James (1991), countries like Denmark, Finland,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and the UK survived the depression years without
general banking crises. Reasons for relatively mild banking crises on the European conti-
nent include sound banking structure, the proactive role of government and central banks,
and exchange-rate policies (Feinstein et al. 2008, Grossman 1994).
20Austria was the rst one to experience a banking crisis which peaked in May 1931 when
its largest deposit bank Credit-Anstalt failed. Even though the nancial crisis in Germany
is generally viewed as a twin crisis largely independent from the events in Austria (e.g.
Feinstein et al. 2008), it was argued that the events in Austria had a signicant indirect
impact on the crisis in Germany (Eichengreen 1992).
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Table 1. The Growth Rate of Money Supply
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933
Belgium 12:5 8:3  2:2  0:3 1:1
Denmark 4:5  3:0  1:1 3:5 0:7
Finland 4:4  1:8  1:7 4:7 4:6
France 10:9 7:3 4:2  1:9  0:8
Germany 0:1  16:6  10:7 5:3 6:1
Italy 9:1 2:3 4:7 5:4 1:9
Netherlands 6:5  4:1 2:8  3:1  2:5
Norway  3:8  4:7  4:9  4:4  4:5
Spain 9:8  3:8 3:1 3:5 4:0
Sweden 4:2 0:6 2:3 2:2 1:5
UK 3:1  6:9 9:3 4:1 4:0
U.S. 1:3  4:7  11:7  2:9 4:5
Bernanke and James (1991) nd a signicant negative e¤ect of banking
crisis on industrial output on a sample of 24 countries in 1930-36. Calomiris
and Mason (2003b) nd that contractions in loan supply induced by bank
distress played an important role in U.S. state level income growth during
the Great Depression. In context of business cycle accounting, Brinca, Chari,
Kehoe and McGrattan (2015) shows that a credit crunch in the form of a
tightening of borrowing constraints on rms with heterogeneous productivity
levels can be mapped into e¢ ciency, investment and labor wedges.
2.3 The Labor Market
The interwar period presents a break-up from pre-1914 labor markets in the
US and Europe which were characterized by little or no welfare policies and
very little unionization (Ritschl and Strausmann 2010, Feinstein et al. 2008).
Post WWI period witnessed a rise of social institutions promoting welfare
policies and unemployment benets, increase in unionization, and collective
bargaining (Eichengreen and Hatton 1988, Cole and Ohanian 2013).
In the U.S., several labor market policies were introduced by Presidents
Hoover and Roosevelt during the Great Depression. In 1929 Hoover in-
troduced an industrial labor program which demanded employers to x or
raise nominal wages and share work among employees in return for protec-
tion from union demands (Ohanian 2009). The subsequent New Deal labor
policies of Roosevelt included the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)
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introduced in 1933 which guaranteed the right of workers to organize trade
unions. The National Recovery Administration codes included xed prices,
minimum wages, maximum hours and covered over 80 percent of private
non-agricultural employees. The National Labor Relations Acts (NLRA)
from 1935 gave even more collective bargaining power to unions than had
the NIRA (Hatton and Thomas 2010).
The situation in Europe during the IGD di¤ered across the countries, with
some of them pursuing direct government interventions into the labor mar-
ket, and some of them increasing labor market protection. In Germany, labor
market policies in 1933-35 involved direct government interventions consist-
ing of reducing female labor-force participation, migration restrictions into
urban areas as well as into mining, metallurgy, construction, brickwork and
railway construction, and the replacement of workers younger than 25 with
older heads of families (Silverman 1988). In Italy, the Fascist government
was also actively intervening into the labor market which involved nominal
wage reductions followed by a 40 hour work week restriction in the end of
1934, and restriction on female and teenage labor market participation (To-
niolo and Piva 1988, Giordano, Piga and Travato 2013). In Belgium, the
unemployment insurance substantially increased in the interwar period and
by 1937, 66 percent of industrial workers were covered (Goossens, Peeters
and Pepermans 1988). In France, major changes in labor market institutions
happened after 1936 when Front Populaire led by Leon Blum put in place
labor market reforms which introduced the 40 hour work week, and com-
pelled employers to recognize trade unions, and grant collective bargaining
privileges. In addition, nominal wages increased and annual paid vacation
was legislated (Eichengreen 1992, Bridji 2013). Sweden witnessed the growth
of unionization and the fraction of workers covered by collective agreements
negotiated by unions reached 80 percent by the late 1930s (Holmlund 2013).
In the UK several important labor market reforms took place in the 1920s
reecting the recommendations of the Whitely Report in 1917 and a sharp
recession in the early 1920s. The number of Trade Boards that set mini-
mum wages increased to 63 covering 3 million workers while unemployment
benets expanded dramatically covering 63 % of the labor force in 1921. In
contrast to the 1920s, the 1930s there were essentially no changes in UK
labor market institutions (Hatton and Thomas 2010).
Extensive research on labor market institutions suggest that various in-
terwar labor market reforms raised collective bargaining power of the workers
and caused nominal wage rigidities (Eichengreen and Hatton 1988, Hatton
14
1988, Thomas 1992, Hatton and Thomas 2010).21 The general motivation
of these studies was to show that worldwide deation led to ination in real
wages due to nominal wage rigidity and depressed the economy by depressing
labor demand.22 Numerous empirical studies using a wide sample of coun-
tries found evidence of nominal wage rigidity and counter-cyclicality of the
real wage (Eichengreen and Sachs 1985, Newel and Symons 1988, Bernanke
and Carey 1996).23
Figure 4 presents the real wages in the U.S. and Europe.24 In both
economies the real wages rise dramatically during the early 1930s.25 This
is consistent with the empirical ndings in the literature that nominal wage
stickiness and deation increased the cost of labor during IGD. Interestingly,
however, the real wages in the U.S. and Europe remained well above their
1929 level even after the ination rate recovered to a positive level in the mid-
21Benjamin and Kochin (1979) claim that unemployment benets raised the opportunity
cost of working and increased unemployment during the interwar period. Hatton and
Thomas (2010) conclude that while the e¤ects of unemployment benets on labor supply
is limited, they inuenced wages set by collective bargaining by reducing the negative
consequences of unemployment.
22This conclusion is not unchallenged. Madsen (2004) argues that price rather than
wage stickiness played a major role in the propagation of the Great Depression.
23Several studies have also explored the role of wage rigidities on country-basis. Fisher
and Hornstein (2002) nd that in Germany, real wages were above their market clearing
levels and thus contributed to the decline of output during the Great Depression. Perri
and Quadrini (2002) nd that though the fall of international trade was a major cause of
output fall in Italy, it was amplied by the real wage stickiness. Dimsdale, Nickell and
Horsewood (1989) analyze the behavior of real wages in Britain from the mid-1920s to
1938 and nd nominal wage inertia in that period and maintain that inexibility of the
supply side of the economy and wage setting behavior enabled the price shocks to have
real impact on the economy. Several studies nd that Hoovers industrial labor program
contributed to nominal wage rigidity causing the U.S. Great Depression in conjunction
with the deation (Vedder and Galloway 1993, Bordo, Erceg and Evans 2000, Ebell and
Ritschl 2008, Ohanian 2009). Gorodnichenko, Mendoza and Tesar (2012) and Lama and
Medina (2019) show that real wage rigidity can amplify the e¤ects of external and scal
shocks. Their mechanism is consistent with the decline in output experienced during the
International Great Depression, as well as the recovery driven by government spending.
24The real wage is computed as the nominal hourly wage in industry divided by the
wholesale price index. The real wage is detrended by the output growth rate and nor-
malized at 1929 = 0 since the units are not comparable across countries. For Europe the
aggregate real wage is the average of detrended and normalized individual wages weighted
by the output share of each country.
25Rising real wages in Europe and North America has been extensively documented by
Williamson (1995).
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1930s. Bordo, Erceg and Evans (2000) nd that the contractionary monetary
policy can quantitatively account for more than half of the economic down-
turn in the U.S. over the 1929 to 1933 period in a sticky wage model, whereas
it cannot account for the slow recovery. Cole and Ohanian (2004), Christiano,
Motto and Rostagno (2004) and Cole and Ohanian (2013) conclude that the
anti-competitive New Deal policies enhancing the bargaining power of la-
bor unions led to a rise in real wages and slow recovery, which is consistent
with the rise in the nominal wage.26 In order to illustrate the arguments
reviewed above, we show in the appendix that both unanticipated monetary
shocks with nominal wage rigidity and increasing collective bargaining power
operate as distortionary taxes on labor income, i.e., labor wedges.27
Figure 4. Real Wages in the U.S. and Europe
In sum, there is a large body of research which argues for substantial dis-
tortions in the labor and capital markets. We have discussed that these dis-
26Eggertson (2012) studies the impact of NIRA and the New Deal policies within a
model with staggered price setting. He nds that the anti-competitive policies could have
been expansionary under emergency conditions with zero interest rate bounds and large
deationary shocks.
27Buera and Moll (2018) show that credit market frictions can also manifest themselves
as labor wedges. However, the literature suggests that labor market frictions could have
played a preponderant role in driving the dynamics of the labor wedges.
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tortions can be mapped into wedges in the business cycle accounting frame-
work. In the following sections, we use the business cycle accounting method
to investigate the quantitative signicance of these distortions in Europe and
the U.S. respectively.
3 The Benchmark Model
Our benchmark model departs from the original CKM (2007) model in that
we incorporate endogenous capital utilization. The main reason we intro-
duce capital utilization is to disentangle the exogenous and endogenous com-
ponents of production e¢ ciency. The capital and labor market distortions
we discussed above can a¤ect production e¢ ciency by a¤ecting the demand
for capital services. Ignoring this channel will understate the quantitative
impacts of capital and labor market distortions on the Great Depression.
Details of the model are as follows.
3.1 Household





where the periodical utility depends on consumption ct, and labor lt:
u(ct; lt) = 	 ln ct + (1 	) ln (1  lt) :
In our model, labor supply is dened as total hours worked per population
normalized such that the maximum hours worked per worker is equal to one.
The household maximizes the lifetime utility subject to the following
budget constraint
(1   l;t)wtlt + (1   k;t)rtuk;tkt + t +  t = ct + xt
where  l;t and  k;t are labor and capital income taxes, wt and rt are the real
wage and the rental rate on capital, kt and uk;t are capital stock and the
utilization rate of capital, t is the dividend income received as the owner
of the rm,  t is transfer income from the government and xt is investment.
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We dene labor and investment wedges as
!l;t = (1   l;t);
!k;t = (1   k;t);
respectively.
Capital stock accumulates according to the following capital law of motion
 kt+1 = xt + (1  t)kt;
where the depreciation rate t depends on the utilization rate of capital stock
as in Greenwood, Hercowitz and Hu¤man (1988). We assume the functional




From the households perspective, a higher capital utilization rate increases
capital income while at the same time it increases the depreciation rate of
capital.
3.2 Firm
The representative rm produces a single nal good using labor lt and capital
service uk;tkt which it hires from the household at the rates of wt and rt,
respectively. Therefore, the rms prot maximization problem is as follows:
maxt = yt   wtlt   rtuk;tkt:
For the production technology, we assume a Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion:
yt = !e;t (uk;tkt)
 l1 t
where !e;t is the time varying productivity of the rm, which we call e¢ ciency
wedges.
3.3 Government
The government collects labor and capital income taxes from the household
in order to nance its exogenous purchases gt. The remainder is transferred
to the household in a lump sum fashion. Therefore, the government budget
constraint is:
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 l;twtlt +  k;trtuk;tkt =  t + gt:
We can combine the household budget constraint, the rms prot and
the government budget constraint to derive the resource constraint of the
economy:
yt = ct + xt + gt:
Since the economy is closed, the trade balance does not appear in the resource
constraint. As the original CKM (2007), we treat the trade balance as part
of gt.
For convenience, we dene government wedges !g;t as the deviation of





3.4 Exogenous Stochastic Process
In this model, we have four exogenous variables which we dene as wedges:
!t = (!e;t; !g;t; !k;t; !l;t)
0 :
We assume that the wedges follow a rst order vector autoregressive
process: e!t = Pg!t 1 + "t; "t  N(0; V );
where the ~ refers to the log linear deviation of each variable from its
steady state. The error terms are assumed to be mean zero and are allowed
to have contemporaneous correlations among each other. In terms of the
transition matrix P , we follow CKM (2007) and impose a restriction such
that the government wedges do not have any spill-over e¤ects from and onto
other wedges.
3.5 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is a sequence of quantities and prices
fyt; ct; xt; lt; uk;t; kt+1;  t; !e;t; !g;t; !k;t; !l;t; wt; rtg
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such that, (i) the household optimizes given fwt; rtg and f t; !k;t; !l;tg; (ii)
the rm optimizes given fwt; rtg and !e;t; (iii) the government budget con-
straint and the resource constraint holds; and (iv) the wedges follow the
stochastic process.


























yt = !e;t (uk;tkt)
 l1 t ; (4)





yt = ct + xt + g!g;t: (6)
In particular, equation (3) characterizes e¢ cient capital utilization. This
states that households will supply capital utilization up to the point where




The parameters that dene the steady state of the model are calibrated
to target data values as described below. The calibrated parameters and
steady states are listed in Table 2. For simplicity, for Europe we report
the population weighted average parameter and steady state values. For
estimation and simulation, we use country specic values.
28Equations (3) and (5) can be used to substitute capital utilization and capital stock so
that we have four equations and four observables: output, consumption, investment and
labor.
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Table 2. Parameter and Steady State Values
Parameters Steady States
U.S. Europe U.S. Europeb 0.96 0.96 c=y 0.788 0.774
 0.05 0.05 x=y 0.146 0.146
 0.333 0.333 g=y 0.066 0.080
  1.032 1.024 y=k 0.559 0.506
 1.833 1.833 l 0.215 0.273
	 0.244 0.304 !k 0.492 0.544
We set the subjective discount factor b, capital depreciation rate  and
the capital income share  at 0:96, 0:05 and 0:333 for all countries.29 The
growth trend   represents the average growth in technology and population
which is computed as the average growth trend of total GDP over the 1900-
2008 period. We compute the consumption to output ratio c=y, investment
to output ratio x=y and total hours worked per capita l directly from the
data in the 1925-1938 period. For simplicity, we assume that the steady
state e¢ ciency wedge !e and capital utilization rate uk are equal to one. The
steady state output to capital ratio y=k is calibrated to match the steady state
investment to output ratio x=y in equation (5). The steady state government
purchases to output ratio g=y is calibrated to match c=y and x=y in equation
(6) while the steady state government wedge is normalized at 1. The steady
state investment wedge !k is calibrated to match the output to capital ratio
y=k in equation (1). The steady state labor wedge !l is set equal to 1 as it
does not a¤ect any of the results.30 The elasticity of capital utilization  is
calibrated to match !k and y=k in equation (3). Finally, we calibrate 	 to
match l and c=y using (2).
The parameters in the stochastic process are estimated using the Bayesian
method available in DYNARE. The main reason why we resort to structural
29These are in line with quantitative research of the Great Depression. CKM (2007) setb;  and  equal to 0.97, 0.0464 and 0.35. Bridji (2013) set them to 0.96, 0.0664 and 0.34
for France. Fisher and Hornstein (2002) set them to 0.96, 0.0112 and 0.25 for Germany.
Perri and Quadrini (2002) set them to 0.96, 0.1 and 0.33 for Italy. Cole and Ohanian
(2002) set them to 0.93, 0.06 and 0.3 for the U.K. Pensierosa (2011) set them to 0.96, 0.1
and 0.33 for Belgium.
30We can only identify the joint level of !l and 	 in equation (2) given . Neither !l
nor 	 appear in the linearized equilibrium conditions so their levels have no impact on
the dynamics. Therefore, normalizing !l to 1 does not a¤ect the results.
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estimation is because our model contains several latent variables. In par-
ticular, we cannot directly observe the levels of investment wedges because
they are dened in the expectational capital Euler equation. We use data
of output, consumption, investment and labor over the 1925-1938 period
normalized at 1929 = 0. Due to feasibility in a non-linear setting, CKM
(2007) imposes a restriction on the persistence matrix such that there are
no spillover e¤ects related to government wedges. Since we are applying a
linearized method, we have virtually no problem in terms of feasibility and
hence do not impose this restriction.31 The posterior means of the estimated
parameters are listed in Table 3. Pij represents the spill-over of wedges j on
wedges i. i represents the standard deviation of the error term of wedges i.
ij represents the correlation coe¢ cient of the error terms of wedges i and j.
The information of the prior distributions is listed in the appendix.
31Since we use annual data over a short period, increasing the number of parameters
estimated might exacerbate the weak identication problem as described in Brinca, Iskrev
and Loria (2018).
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Table 3. Estimated Parameters
BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET NOR SPA UK US
Pee 0.906 0.761 0.911 0.842 0.856 0.816 0.805 0.882 0.603 0.921 0.910
Pgg 0.737 0.901 0.871 0.728 0.834 0.822 0.734 0.732 0.964 0.798 0.702
Pkk 0.762 0.820 0.805 0.759 0.786 0.759 0.775 0.811 0.863 0.803 0.751
Pll 0.846 0.778 0.817 0.895 0.869 0.840 0.908 0.864 0.701 0.820 0.966
Peg 0.009 -0.03 0.011 -0.002 -0.007 -0.009 0.000 0.008 -0.061 0.020 0.010
Pek -0.056 -0.108 -0.015 -0.130 -0.040 -0.033 -0.052 -0.004 -0.162 -0.004 -0.020
Pel 0.075 -0.011 0.109 0.032 0.003 -0.016 -0.006 0.038 -0.003 0.077 0.006
Pge 0.001 -0.022 0.006 0.021 -0.030 0.001 -0.110 0.000 -0.014 -0.025 -0.019
Pgk -0.006 -0.060 0.056 -0.009 0.014 0.024 0.130 0.001 0.073 -0.050 0.011
Pgl 0.000 -0.068 -0.051 0.010 -0.030 -0.082 -0.148 -0.023 0.024 -0.007 0.020
Pke 0.021 -0.098 -0.067 -0.027 -0.086 -0.057 -0.039 -0.015 0.073 -0.024 -0.056
Pkg 0.017 -0.004 0.007 0.005 0.022 0.008 0.000 -0.003 -0.016 -0.012 0.018
Pkl -0.041 -0.050 -0.069 0.028 -0.075 -0.072 -0.034 -0.075 -0.140 0.075 0.042
Ple 0.068 -0.038 0.114 0.113 0.042 0.103 0.109 0.045 0.130 -0.009 0.118
Plg -0.004 -0.007 -0.007 0.006 -0.007 -0.033 0.007 0.007 0.016 -0.028 -0.030
Plk 0.042 0.065 0.027 -0.033 -0.047 -0.143 -0.142 -0.023 0.046 -0.001 0.007
e 0.026 0.021 0.022 0.040 0.028 0.050 0.029 0.027 0.077 0.020 0.030
g 0.341 1.694 0.228 1.795 0.306 0.249 3.221 0.212 0.966 0.272 0.277
k 0.038 0.048 0.038 0.058 0.043 0.062 0.045 0.037 0.237 0.034 0.033
l 0.024 0.055 0.062 0.060 0.072 0.072 0.026 0.052 0.173 0.028 0.110
eg 0.225 -0.277 0.176 -0.010 -0.062 -0.017 0.453 0.546 -0.630 0.424 -0.064
ek -0.304 -0.316 -0.387 -0.424 -0.262 -0.473 -0.406 -0.301 0.249 -0.382 -0.262
el -0.181 -0.272 0.042 -0.263 -0.266 -0.355 -0.143 -0.285 -0.039 -0.083 -0.318
gk 0.110 -0.247 0.108 -0.130 0.081 0.105 0.576 0.151 -0.288 0.333 -0.004
gl -0.150 -0.574 -0.597 -0.143 0.145 -0.348 -0.218 -0.333 -0.469 -0.132 0.162
kl -0.313 -0.132 -0.089 -0.286 -0.162 -0.372 -0.282 -0.254 -0.636 -0.184 -0.176
4.2 Wedges
In order to reproduce wedges, we rst solve the model for linear decision
rules following Uhlig (1999) so that
gkt+1 = Aekt +B e!teqt = C ekt +D e!t;
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where qt is a vector of endogenous observable variables: qt = (yt; ct; xt; lt).
We rst assume that capital stock and the observables are in steady state in
1929, which implies that wedges in 1929 in steady state as well. Therefore,gk1929 = gq1929 = g!1929;= 0: From 1930 and onwards, the wedges can be
computed by solving the system of equations while updating the capital stock
one period ahead by its linear decision rule using the computed wedges:
e!t = D 1 eqt   C ekt ;gkt+1 = Aekt +B e!t:
The computed wedges for the U.S. and Western Europe are plotted in
Figure 5. The European wedges are population weighted average of each
countrys wedges. In the U.S., labor wedges fall sharply while e¢ ciency and
investment wedges decline mildly during the 1929-1933 period. In Europe,
government and labor wedges fall sharply during the 1929-1932 period.32
32One concern of our results is that the linearization method might not be appropriate for
studying large economic uctuations. In the appendix, we present the di¤erence between
the labor wedges directly computed from the non-linearized labor rst order condition (2)
and those computed from the linearized model. We nd that the linear approximation
errors of labor wedges are not signicant.
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Figure 5. Computed Wedges in the U.S. and Europe
A drop in e¢ ciency wedges reduces output directly as well as the demand
for capital and labor. A drop in government wedges leads to a positive income
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e¤ect which reduces labor supply and output. A drop in investment wedges
reduces the return on e¤ective capital and thus leads to a decline in capital
utilization and output. A drop in labor wedges reduces the return on labor
and thus the decline in labor supply and output. Therefore, these should
all have contributed to the output declines during the IGD. The question is,
how large are these e¤ects?
4.3 Simulation
In order to quantify the e¤ects of each wedge, we simulate the model by
plugging wedges into the model one-by-one and measure the reactions of
each variable. Figure 6 shows the year-by-year reaction of output to each
wedge. The European results are population weighted average of each coun-
trys result. In the U.S. the model with labor wedges alone predicts not only
the drop in output but also the persistence of the depression quite well. In
Europe the model with only labor wedges predicts the initial drop in output
well but it predicts a much more severe and prolonged depression throughout
the mid-1930s. In Europe the improvement in government wedges account
for a recovery much more rapid than that in the data while e¢ ciency and
labor wedges counteract with these forces.
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Figure 6. Simulated Output in the U.S. and Europe
Table 4 summarizes the results. The rst column reports the e¤ect of
each wedge on the drop in output from its 1929 level to its level in the
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trough, 1933 for the U.S. and 1932 for Europe. In terms of the depth of the
depression, labor wedges account for two-thirds of the drop in output from
1929 to their respective troughs in both the U.S. and Europe. In Europe,
e¢ ciency wedges account for the remaining drop of output while in the U.S.,
both e¢ ciency and government wedges share the remaining blame. The
second column reports the e¤ect of each wedge on the recovery of output
from their relative troughs. In the U.S. e¢ ciency wedges alone would have
led to a recovery more rapid than that in the data over the 1933-1938 period.
The third column reports the decomposition of output uctuations into the
contributions of each wedge dened as
contvj = corr(




where fv!jt is the linearized uctuation of variable v in response to f!j whileevt is that of the data. Due to linearity, the sum of the contributions of each
wedge to the overall uctuation of output is equal to 1. In terms of overall
contribution, labor wedges are clearly the most important source of output
uctuation in both economies; in the U.S. they account for almost all and in
Europe they account for more than three quarters of the output uctuation
during the 1929-1938 period.
Table 4. Contribution of Each Wedge on Output
U.S. Europe
1929-33 1933-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:014 0:184  0:069  0:047  0:046 0:415
Government  0:024 0:024 0:042 0:000 0:122  0:209
Investment  0:010  0:034 0:038  0:010 0:045 0:009
Labor  0:394  0:020 0:989  0:112  0:073 0:785
Data  0:443 0:155 1  0:169 0:048 1
Our results are informative in terms of discussing the sources of the IGD.
The importance of labor wedges in both economies supports the view that
the growing inexibility of labor markets accompanied by the deationary
pressure transmitted through the Gold Standard facilitated the drops in out-
put (Eichengreen and Sachs 1985, Newel and Symons 1988, Bernanke and
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Carey 1996). It is also consistent with the view that cartelization policies
which increased labor bargaining power contributed to the severity of the
depression (Christiano, Motto and Rostagno 2004, Ohanian 2009, Cole and
Ohanian 2004, 2013). In addition, e¢ ciency wedges also account for a sig-
nicant drop in output in the early 1930s. One important result is that the
role of investment wedges in accounting for the Great Depression is limited,
which is consistent with CKM (2007), even when we include endogenous
capital utilization. Therefore, if nancial frictions triggered the IGD, it must
have manifested themselves as labor and/or e¢ ciency wedges and not as
investment wedges.
Our results also shed light on the recovery during the IGD. The role of
government wedges in the recovery of Europe is consistent with the view
that the rearmament contributed to the recovery (Ritschl 2002, Temin 1991,
Thomas 1983). According to the 1947 System of National Accounts report,
all military expenditure was treated as government consumption.33 There-
fore, rearmament manifests itself as a rise in government wedges in our model.
Next, we investigate how each wedge a¤ects the capital utilization rate.
Table 5 presents the simulated capital utilization in both economies. Since
capital utilization is a latent variable in our model, the Data refers to
the simulated uctuation of the utilization rate in the model with all wedges.
The results show that capital utilization drops dramatically during the initial
period of IGD in both economies. In the U.S. labor wedges are the most
important in accounting for the drop in capital utilization during the initial
period while in Europe all wedges contribute signicantly to its drop.
Table 5. Contribution of Each Wedge on Capital Utilization
U.S. Europe
1929-33 1933-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:015 0:088 0:078  0:014 0:023 0:162
Government  0:013 0:013 0:087  0:008 0:018 0:235
Investment  0:028  0:020  0:089  0:022 0:038 0:360
Labor  0:136 0:078 0:925  0:044 0:046 0:244
Data  0:192 0:159 1  0:088 0:125 1
33Note that in our model government wedges do not include government investment.
Scherner (2013) claims that part of military spending was actually counted as government
investment in Germany. If this was truely the case, the adjusted government wedges should
have had an even larger e¤ect during the recovery period.
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4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we modify the model and provide several sensitivity analyses.
The contribution indexes of each wedge are listed in Table 6 along with the
results from our benchmark (BM) model. First, we compare our results
with those from a model with xed factor utilization. This corresponds to
original business cycle accounting model of CKM (2007). Next, we introduce
a model with investment adjustment costs following Christiano and Fisher
(2006) which we call the AC model. Finally, we introduce a model with
endogenous labor utilization as in Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1993)
which we call the labor hoarding (LH) model.
Table 6. Sensitivity Analysis: Contribution Index
U.S.
BM CKM AC LH
E¢ ciency  0:069 0:096  0:163  0:424
Government 0:042 0:025 0:045 0:063
Investment 0:038 0:009 0:164  0:254
Labor 0:989 0:871 0:954 1:614
Data 1 1 1 1
Europe
BM CKM AC LH
E¢ ciency 0:415 0:453 0:115 0:104
Government  0:209  0:024 0:026  0:382
Investment 0:009  0:061 0:255  0:098
Labor 0:785 0:631 0:604 1:376
Data 1 1 1 1
4.4.1 Fixed Utilization
One important di¤erence between our model and the original business cycle
accounting model in CKM (2007) is that we consider endogenous capital
utilization.34 In order to illustrate the e¤ect of capital utilization on output
34There are also di¤erences in data series. First, we use private consumption expendi-
ture as consumption whereas CKM (2007) uses household expenditure on non-durables
and services as consumption. Next, we use gross xed capital formation as investment
whereas CKM (2007) uses the sum of gross capital formation and household expenditure
on durables as investment. Since we do not have data on expenditure on durables for most
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uctuation, we simulated the model with uk;t = 1 which is equivalent to the
original model of CKM (2007).
In the model with constant factor utilization e¢ ciency wedges are equiv-
alent to Total Factor Productivity (TFP) i.e. the Solow residual:
fAt = eyt   ekt   (1  )elt:
On the other hand, in our model e¢ ciency wedges are dened as
g!e;t = eyt    ekt + fuk;t : (7)
Therefore, we can decompose TFP into exogenous e¢ ciency wedges and en-
dogenous factor utilization
fAt =g!e;t + fuk;t: (8)
The simulation results presented in Table 5 show that e¢ ciency wedges would
have accounted for much more of the depressions in both economies in a
model without endogenous capital utilization.35
Figure 7 plots the measured TFP and its decomposition into the two com-
ponents on the right-hand side of (8). TFP in the U.S. showed a much more
severe decline while the recovery was more rapid than that in Europe. Over-
all, TFP in the U.S. ended up higher in 1938 than in 1925 while in Europe it
ended up lower.36 The decomposition indicates that endogenous utilization
accounts for a signicant amount of the drop in TFP during the IGD in both
economies. Therefore, endogenous capital utilization is an important channel
for the transmission of factor market distortions and without these channels
we signicantly overstate the contribution of e¢ ciency wedges on the IGD.
European countries, we could not make this adjustment. Finally, CKM (2007) removes
military compensation from GDP while we could not make this adjustment.
35Cole and Ohanian (2013) and Weder (2006) also show that capital utilization is im-
portant in accounting for the US Great Depression.
36This is consistent with Field (2006) which shows that in the U.S. both labor and
capital productivity and hence TFP were growing in the depression years as a result of
advances in manufacturing sector combined with advances in transportation, distribution,
and public utilities.
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Figure 7. TFP Decomposition
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4.4.2 Capital Adjustment Cost
Christiano and Fisher (2006) points out that capital adjustment costs in-
crease the importance of investment wedges.37 We follow their setting and
modify the capital law of motion to

































We set the parameter value  so that the marginal Tobins q is equal
to 1/4 following CKM (2007). The results in Table 5 show that the intro-
duction of the capital adjustment cost dramatically increases the importance
of investment wedges. In fact, investment wedges become the second most
important in both the U.S and Europe. In our model, the quantitative im-
portance of investment wedges increases much more than they do in CKM
(2007) due to endogenous capital utilization. However, this does not overturn
the result that labor wedges are the most important wedge for the IGD.
4.4.3 Labor Hoarding
Up to now we considered capital utilization as the sole endogenous com-
ponent of TFP but we can also consider endogenous labor utilization. We
follow Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (1993) and modify the production
function to
yt = !e;t (uk;tkt)
 (ul;tlt)
1  ;
where ul;t is the labor utilization which can be considered as the intensity of
the job or the e¤ort of the workers that provide total hours of work lt. The
rms prot maximization problem changes accordingly to
maxt = yt   wtul;tlt   rtuk;tkt:
37They show that the procyclicality of the marginal adjustment cost generates invest-
ment wedges even though there are actually no frictions.
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We also modify the periodical preference function to
u(ct; lt) = 	 ln ct + (1 	)
 





where (1   	)lt
u1+l;t
1+
represents the utility cost of the intensity of the job
or the e¤ort. The household maximizes the life time utility subject to the
following budget constraint
(1   l;t)wtul;tlt + (1   k;t)rtuk;tkt + t +  t = ct + xt:




















For simplicity, we set the steady state level of ul;t equal to 1. With no
clear target to pin down the parameter  we set this equal to 1. This will pin
down the level of  from (9):We also recalibrate the level of 	 from (10). The
results in Table 5 show that the introduction of the labor utilization increases
the importance of labor wedges. This is true for 1 >   1 while the labor
hoarding model with  = 1 is equivalent to the benchmark model because
the uctuation of labor utilization relative to labor becomes innitesimally
small from (9).
5 Discussion
5.1 The Gold Standard
As was argued earlier in the paper, the research over the past few decades
concluded that the deationary pressures were transmitted across countries
through the operation of the Gold Standard and that the distortions of the
labor and capital markets channeled that deation into the real economy.
As a consequence, leaving the Gold Standard might have fostered a recov-
ery by ending these deationary pressures. Indeed, several papers such as
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Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), Eichengreen (1992) and Cole and Ohanian
(2013) showed that the countries which left the Gold Standard early on ex-
perienced a faster recovery than the countries which stayed on it longer. In
this section we are going to discuss the implications of our ndings from the
business cycle accounting for the recovery from the IGD taking into account
the adherence to the Gold Standard.
There are several reasons, discussed in the literature, why the abandon-
ment of the Gold Standard could have led to the recovery of the Early
Leavers. Leaving the xed exchange-rate regime allowed currencies to depre-
ciate hence to increase countriescompetitiveness on the international market
which then improved their balance of payment and increased aggregate de-
mand (Eichengreen and Sachs 1985, Eichengreen and Irvin 2010). Leaving
the Gold Standard also removed the imperative of cutting domestic spend-
ing and rising taxes to defend the exchange rate and allowed changing the
expectations from deation to ination thus enabling to escape the liquidity
trap (Eichengreen 2008, Eggertson 2008, Crafts and Fearon 2010). Indeed,
according to Eichengreen and Sachs (1985), once prices began to rise, in-
creased protability - both current as well as future - encouraged investment
which lead to the rise in industrial production and recovery. Finally, ina-
tion lowered real wages which then stimulated labor demand (Eichengreen
and Sachs 1985).
Table 7 presents the dates at which each European country changed the
Gold Standard policy according to Bernanke and James (1991) along with the
changes of the detrended output over the 1929-1932 and 1932-1938 periods.
The policy changes from the Gold Standard could be devaluation, foreign
exchange control or suspension. We split the countries into two groups;
those that abandoned the Gold Standard in 1931 which we call the Early
Leavers (Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, Spain, Sweden and UK) and
those that abandoned it after 1934 which we call the Late Leavers (Belgium,
France, Italy and the Netherlands). From the aggregate of the two groups,
we cannot nd much di¤erence in the magnitude of the depression in the
two groups whereas there is a clear di¤erence in the persistence; the Early
Leavers recovered quite rapidly compared to the Late Leavers. Among the
countries that abandoned the Gold Standard in 1931, Denmark and Spain are
the only ones that did not show signicant recovery. However, Denmark did
not experience a large output drop to begin with and the collapse of Spanish
output was due to the civil war which is an exogenous shock unrelated to the
Gold Standard.
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Table 7. Changes in the Gold Standard Policies
Early Leavers: Countries Abandoning Gold Standard in 1931
Country Date of Alternative Output Growth
Leaving Policy 1929-32 1932-38
Denmark September 1931 Suspension  0:040  0:008
Finland October 1931 Suspension  0:138 0:193
Germany July 1931 ForEx Control  0:241 0:288
Norway September 1931 Suspension  0:052 0:055
Spain May 1931 ForEx Control  0:134  0:491
Sweden September 1931 Suspension  0:078 0:137
UK September 1931 Suspension  0:113 0:104
Sub Total - -  0:170 0:087
Late Leavers: Countries Abandoning Gold Standard after 1934
Country Date of Alternative Output Growth
Leaving Policy 1929-32 1932-38
Belgium March 1935 Devaluation  0:144  0:055
France October 1936 Devaluation  0:230 0:007
Italy May 1934 ForEx Control  0:115  0:016
Netherlands October 1936 Devaluation  0:177  0:068
Sub Total - -  0:171  0:013
Although, due to the outbreak of the WWII we do not have enough of
data to conclude that staying on the Gold Standard longer led to a slow
recovery of the Late Leavers, we can compare how the distortions on the
factor markets interplayed with the adherence to the deation-transmitting
Gold Standard. Table 8 compares the simulation results for the Early Leavers
and Late Leavers. The results show that the main source of the depression
for both groups was the labor wedges. Since both groups were on the Gold
Standard during this period, this result is consistent with the view that sticky
wages and the global deation created labor market distortions. In terms
of the recovery in the Early Leavers, the government wedges had a strong
positive impact on output growth after 1932. On the other hand, the sluggish
recovery of the Late Leavers was mainly due to the further deterioration in
the labor wedges.
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Table 8. Contribution of Each Wedge on Output: Gold Standard
Early Leavers Late Leavers
1929-32 1932-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:016  0:161 0:124  0:103 0:131 0:208
Government  0:007 0:171 0:060 0:009 0:049  0:214
Investment  0:058 0:096 0:325 0:063  0:035  0:201
Labor  0:089  0:019 0:491  0:140  0:158 1:207
Data  0:170 0:087 1  0:171  0:013 1
An interesting result is that the government wedges had a signicant
contribution to the depression and recovery of the Early Leavers while they
had less impact on the Late Leavers. One possible interpretation of this
result is that the Early Leavers who were hit strongly by the deterioration
of the trade balance during the early stage of the depression abandoned the
Gold Standard to stimulate foreign demand through currency depreciation.
However, our country-by-country results in the appendix shows that the large
contribution of government wedges on the recovery of Early Leavers is mainly
driven by the increase in government wedges in Germany, which is mainly
due to the increase in government consumption for rearmament.
Finally, the result that the deterioration of labor wedges further depressed
the economy of Late Leavers is consistent with the view that staying on the
Gold Standard prolonged the deation leading to distortions in the labor
markets.38 In order to illustrate this view, we plot the real wages in Early
Leavers and Late Leavers in Figure 8. This gure clearly shows that the real
wage of Early Leavers declined after 1931 while that of Late Leavers further
increased until the mid-1930s. One remaining question is that the real wage
in Late Leavers fell dramatically in 1936 whereas the depressing e¤ect of
38In France, for example, deationary policies prevailed despite the growing domestic
opposition against them. Indeed, even though the government of Pierre-Etienne Flandin,
formed in November 1934, initiated reationary policies, it fell back to the deationary
policies once the xed parity between franc and the gold came under attack. After the
fall of Flandins government in 1935, the new government led by Pierre Laval reversed all
Flandins reationary policies and issued a series of so-called deationary decrees (Moure
1988, Eichengreen 1992). Even when the Front Populaire won the election in May 1936
with the election program of no further deation, France did not leave the Gold Standard
immediately. It was argued that France wanted to coordinate its exit and the devaluation of
franc with Britain (Moure 1988). The announcement of 21bln franc rearmament program
in September 1936, however, provided the nal push to exit the gold standard and France
devaluated in the following weeks (Moure 1988, Eichengreen 1992, Wolf 2008).
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labor wedges persisted till 1938. This most likely reects the drastic 40 hour
work week policy introduced in Italy in the end of 1934 and in France in
1936, which reduced total hours worked while real wages declined.
Figure 8. Real Wages in Europe
5.2 Fiscal Policy during the IGD
Fiscal policy framework in the interwar years was di¤erent in its nature and
magnitude relative to post WWII decades. Whilst many countries began to
implement policies which closely resembles scal policies of the post WWII
times e.g. emergence of unemployment benets, various forms of welfare
support their scope and target was small by todays standards. Attitude
towards scal policies by policy-makers was also driven by pre WWI stance
in which countries economic success was tied to the commitment to the
gold standard, and that monetary policy played a dominant role to achieve
it. Indeed, return to the gold was a priority in many nations and an active
large-scale scal policy was deemed inconsistent with that goal (e.g. Feinstein
et al 2008). This is not to say that scal policy was only tied to by todays
standards small scale welfare programs: defence spending was a large part
of government expenditures. However, once the WWI was over, balanced
government budget was again priority.
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Fiscal policy framework began to change during the Great Depression.
The most notable is the New Deal in the United State but other countries
tried scal policies as well. The magnitude of the New Deal, though small
by todays standards, was above and beyond anything tried in peace time
before. The literature debates its overall e¤ect on the recovery from the Great
Depressions (see Fishback (2017) for an extensive overview of the New Deal
Policies) but it a consensus emerges that it represented a policy regime change
which, together with the abandonment of the Gold Standard, helped recovery.
Eggertson (2008) builds a DSGE model to assess the importance of such
policy regime change. He shows that unlike the policies of President Hoover
characterized by small government, balanced budget, and the Gold Standard,
Roosevelts presidency since 1933 was a policy regime change which included
not only abandonment of the Gold Standard, but also a signicant scal
expansion, leading to a large shift in expectations and subsequent recovery.
United States was not the only country which left the Gold Standard and
expanded scal policy though. United Kingdom, which left the gold in 1931,
embarked on large scal expansion in 1935 in form of rearmament. Literature
has debated its e¤ect on the recovery from the Great Depressions, but recent
estimates by Crafts and Mills (2013) suggest that the e¤ect, though not large
in magnitude, helped to further promote the recovery after leaving the Gold
Standard.
5.3 The Great Recession
The Great Recession of 2008 was the largest worldwide economic crisis since
the International Great Depression (IGD). This led to a spark of interest
in the di¤erences and similarities among the Great Recession and IGD. In
this section, we compare the two episodes through the lens of business cycle
accounting.
There are recent studies conducting business cycle accounting for various
countries during the Great Recession. Brinca, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan
(2016) study the cases for 24 OECD countries and nd that labor wedges
were most important in the U.S. and e¢ ciency wedges were most important
in most other countries in accounting for the output drop. Gerth and Otsu
(2018) nd that e¢ ciency wedges were most important in accounting for
the prolonged post-crisis slump in 30 European countries. We use the same
model and sample countries as our IGD exercise to compare the IGD with
the Great Recession while avoiding the overstatement of e¢ ciency wedges by
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incorporating endogenous capital utilization.
Figure 9 presents the business cycle accounting results on output in the
US and Europe corresponding to Figure 6. In the U.S., the model with labor
wedges alone predicts the initial drop in output over the 2007-2009 period
very well. However, the extended recession can be attributed to the deterio-
ration in e¢ ciency wedges. One interesting result is that in the U.S. govern-
ment wedges initially preventing the decline in output while they contribute
to the prolonged recession after 2009. This reects the temporary increase
in government consumption as part of the stimulus package based on the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. In Europe, the model
with e¢ ciency wedges alone predicts the economic downturn very well. La-
bor wedges also contribute to the economic downturn but at a lesser extent.
Government wedges had little e¤ect on output while the improvement in in-
vestment wedges counteracted the downward pressure caused by e¢ ciency
and labor wedges.
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Figure 9. Simulated Output in the U.S. and Europe
Table 9 summarizes the results. The rst two columns for both the U.S.
and Europe report the e¤ect of each wedge on the drops of output during
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the 2007-2009 and 2009-2016 periods, respectively. In the U.S. labor wedges
was the main culprit of the initial decline in output. However, the dramatic
improvement in labor wedges would have brought back output nearly to its
trend level hadnt it been for the further deterioration of e¢ ciency wedges
during the 2009-2016 period. In Europe, e¢ ciency wedges account for not
only most of the initial drop of output, but also the prolonged slump during
the 2009-2016 period. These results are consistent with the ndings of Brinca,
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2016) and Gerth and Otsu (2018). The third
column shows that e¢ ciency wedges are the most important sources of the
Great Recession in both U.S. and Western Europe; in the U.S. they account
for nearly all and in Europe they account for more than 80 percent of the
output uctuation during the 2007-2016 period. Our results show that the
Great Recession was driven primarily by deterioration in e¢ ciency wedges,
even after controlling for endogenous utilization, unlike the IGD which was
driven primarily by labor wedges.
Table 9. Contribution of Each Wedge on Output
U.S. Europe
2007-09 2009-16 Cont 2007-09 2009-16 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:028  0:091 0:860  0:081  0:085 0:884
Government 0:041  0:061 0:130 0:001  0:003 0:014
Investment 0:002 0:032  0:438  0:002 0:035  0:217
Labor  0:102 0:079 0:447  0:011  0:029 0:347
Data  0:087  0:040 1  0:092  0:082 1
6 Conclusion
In this paper we compare the U.S. and Western Europe and analyze the
International Great Depression (IGD) using the business cycle accounting
method with endogenous capital utilization. We nd that labor wedges are
important in accounting for the Great Depression in both economies and that
endogenous capital utilization reinforces the impact of labor wedges. This is
consistent with the view that anti-competitive labor market policies which
increased labor bargaining power and deationary forces transmitted through
the Gold Standard are the main sources of the IGD. Furthermore, models
with frictions which manifest themselves as investment wedges cannot explain
the output drops in the U.S. and Europe during the early 1930s. We also
nd that government wedges helped the recovery from the IGD in Europe,
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especially the countries which left the Gold Standard in the early 1930s.
This implies that the increase in government consumption for rearmament
were important in accounting for the recovery in Europe. On the other
hand, countries that remained on the Gold Standard further su¤ered from
deterioration in labor wedges. The result that IGD was mainly driven by
labor wedges is in stark contrast with results for the Great Recession which
points to e¢ ciency wedges as the main driver. A comparison of the di¤erences
in labor institutions and production e¢ ciency during the IGD and the Great
Recession is left for future research.
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A Equivalence Results: Detailed Models of
Investment and Labor Wedges
A.1 Expectational ShockModel and InvestmentWedges
Following Harrison and Weder (2006), the rm maximizes its prot






and At represents aggregate externality. The externality is taken as exoge-







where variables with   are aggregate variables. The parameter  > 0
represents the degree of externality.
Now consider the consumers problem which is equivalent to that of the
benchmark model with constant labor utilization and no wedges. The house-




t [	 ln ct + (1 	) ln (1  lt)]
subject to
wtlt + rtuk;tkt + t +  t = ct + xt:




















From the labor rst order condition


















  > 1 the labor demand is increasing in wage. This model
can contain multiple equilibria due to an upward sloping labor demand curve.
Imagine that there is an exogenous positive non-fundamental expecta-
tional shock to the future output, yt+1. The increase in future expected
output raises the future expected marginal product of capital and hence in-
creases current investment demand. An increase in future expected income
also increases demand for consumption and decreases labor supply. If we
assume that the labor demand curve is upward sloping with a slope steeper
than the labor supply curve, this shift in the labor supply curve will lead to
an increase in current labor input and wages. The increase in current labor
input raises the current marginal product of capital which leads to an increase
in capital utilization. The increase in current labor and capital utilization
enables current output, consumption and investment to increase. Finally, an
increase in future output due to the growth in capital stock validates the
optimistic expectation.
Comparing the capital Euler equation
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ct











to that in the benchmark model, (1) combined with (3),
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ct












we can see that expectational shocks can be observationally equivalent to
investment wedges.
A.2 Predetermined Wage Model and Labor Wedges
Consider a model as Cole and Ohanian (2004) in which labor unions have
monopoly power on di¤erentiated labor lt(j) and has a bargaining power
on nominal wage contracts that are set one period ahead of employment.








where t represents the labor unions bargaining power. Following Eggert-
son (2012) we consider this as a time varying parameter. The rms cost
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where Wt 1(j) is the predetermined nominal wage for labor j and Wt 1 is
the aggregate wage index.




t [u (ct(j); lt(j))] :
For simplicity we assume that the labor is the only production factor in the
economy so that the budget constraint is
Wt 1(j)lt(j) = Ptct(j);
where Pt is the general price level and ct is consumption. Optimization leads









where we assume a symmetric equilibrium and drop the j notation.




















we can see that an unexpected deation i.e. Pt < Et 1[Pt] creates a wedge
between the marginal product of labor and the marginal rate of substitution
between labor and consumption. Intuitively speaking, deation raises the
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real wage that the rm must pay given the predetermined nominal wage,
and hence reduces labor demand. An increase in the unions bargaining
power t also creates a wedges in the labor market. This is because a rise
in the monopoly power of labor unions gives an incentive for the union to
demand higher contract wages for members and as a result the labor demand
will fall. This corresponds to the mechanism proposed by Cole and Ohanian
(2004) which explains how the New Deal policies may have prolonged the
Great Depression.
B Estimation for the Benchmark Model
In our model, investment wedges as well as factor utilization and hence ef-
ciency wedges are all latent variables so that we cannot directly estimate
the stochastic process of wedges. Therefore, we rely on structural estimation
of the persistence matrix P , variance covariance matrix V . The estimation
results are listed in Table A1.39 Pij represents the spill-over of wedges j on
wedges i. i represents the standard deviation of the error term of wedges i.
ij represents the correlation coe¢ cient of the error terms of wedges i and j.
39Estimation results are available upon request.
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Table A1. Bayesian Estimation Prior
Parameter Distribution. Mean S.E. Support
Pee normal 0.8 0.1 R
Pgg normal 0.8 0.1 R
Pkk normal 0.8 0.1 R
Pll normal 0.8 0.1 R
Peg normal 0 0.1 R
Pek normal 0 0.1 R
Pel normal 0 0.1 R
Pge normal 0 0.1 R
Pgk normal 0 0.1 R
Pgl normal 0 0.1 R
Pke normal 0 0.1 R
Pkg normal 0 0.1 R
Pkl normal 0 0.1 R
Ple normal 0 0.1 R
Plg normal 0 0.1 R
Plk normal 0 0.1 R
e inverse gamma 0.05 2.0 R+
g inverse gamma 0.05 2.0 R+
k inverse gamma 0.05 2.0 R+
l inverse gamma 0.05 2.0 R+
eg beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1]
ek beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1]
el beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1]
gk beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1]
gl beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1]
kl beta 0 0.3 [ 1; 1]
C Linearization Errors
One concern of our results is that the linearization method might not be
appropriate to study large economic uctuations. When uctuations of the
variables become large, the linear approximation errors will increase. In this
section we focus on the labor wedge to understand the magnitude of this
issue.
Since the labor rst order condition (2) is a static equation in which
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only the labor wedge is unknown, we can directly calculate non-linear labor
wedges using data of observable variables. We take a log of the computed
non-linear labor wedge and normalize at 1929 = 0 to compare them with the
labor wedges computed from the linearized model. The standard deviations
of each series for each country are listed in Table A2. It turns out that the
magnitude of errors from linear approximation in computing labor wedges
are not signicant.
Table A2. Standard Deviations in Labor Wedges
Non-Linear FOC Model Di¤erence
Denmark 1.71% 1.72% 0.01%
Finland 7.48% 7.44% -0.04%
France 10.80% 10.83% 0.03%
Germany 9.41% 9.67% 0.27%
Italy 9.19% 9.36% 0.17%
Netherlands 15.32% 15.47% 0.15%
Norway 10.49% 10.53% 0.03%
Spain 7.78% 7.77% 0.00%
Sweden 22.27% 22.27% 0.00%
UK 5.51% 5.55% 0.04%
US 6.18% 6.14% -0.05%
D Individual Simulation Results of European
Countries
In Table A3 we present the individual simulation results for the European
countries. We mainly focus on France, Germany, Italy and the UK because
they are signicantly larger than other European economies; the GDP shares
in 1929 relative to the aggregate European economy in our sample are 18.6%,
25.1%, 12.0% and 24.1% respectively, which adds up to 79.8 %.
France experienced one of the largest and persistent depressions in Eu-
rope. In France labor wedges contribute the most to the overall output uc-
tuation. Both labor and e¢ ciency wedges individually account for the initial
drop of output equally as large as in the data while investment wedges coun-
teract this e¤ect during the 1929-1932 period. Investment and labor wedges
further depress the economy while e¢ ciency wedges are counteracting this
e¤ect during the recovery period. A notable shock to the labor market is the
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40 hour work week policy introduced in 1936 which caused a decline in labor
supply.
The German depression was as large as that in France whereas, unlike in
France output fully recovered by 1938. In Germany government and labor
wedges contribute roughly half each to the overall output uctuation. Labor
wedges account for most of the initial drop of output during 1929-1932 while
government wedges account for most of the recovery during the 1932-1938
period. The large role played by government wedges on the recovery can
be attributed to the increased government spending on rearmament (Ritschl
2002, Temin 1991).
The output drop in Italy between 1929 to 1932 was about half of that in
France and Germany where output remained at its trough level throughout
the 1930s as in the case of France. In Italy labor wedges are by far the most
important wedge in accounting for the overall uctuation in output. Labor
wedges account for more than all of the initial drop in output. The slow
recovery is mainly due to the further deterioration in labor wedges while
government wedges were counteracting these forces. The deterioration in
labor wedges are consistent with the Fascist labor market policies including
the 40 hour work week restrictions introduced in 1934. The increase in gov-
ernment wedges is consistent with the increase in military expenditure due
to the Italo-Ethiopian war during 1935-36.
The depression in the UK during the 1930s was half the size of those in
France and Germany and relatively short-lived. In fact, the Great Depres-
sion in the UK began in the early 1920s and the 1930s was a continuation
of this depression period.40 In the UK labor wedges contribute most to the
overall output uctuation. E¢ ciency wedges alone can fully account for the
initial output drop. Unlike other countries, labor wedges did not contribute
much to the drop in output during the 1929 to 1932 period partially because
the work week was already reduced signicantly due to union bargaining in
the early 1920s (Broadberry 1986, 1990, Cole and Ohanian 2002). Moreover,
the improvement in labor wedges accounts for most of the recovery in output
during the 1932-1938 period. Also, as in Germany and Italy, government
wedges contributed to the recovery implying the expansionary e¤ect of rear-
mament as stated in Thomas (1983). Crafts and Mills (2013) argues that
40The UK Great Depression in the 1920s is documented in Cole and Ohanian (2002).
They nd that the labor policies that discouraged labor supply were to blame for the
depression.
58
the news of massive future defense spending after 1935 provided a boost to
real GDP in the UK by stimulating private expenditure. This is consistent
with the positive e¤ect of investment wedges on output during the recovery
period.
Table A3. Contribution of Each Wedge on Output
Belgium Denmark
1929-32 1932-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:124  0:072 0:902 0:081  0:072 0:348
Government  0:009 0:013  0:019 0:080  0:058  0:580
Investment  0:007 0:017 0:006  0:002 0:067  0:504
Labor  0:004  0:014 0:112  0:199 0:056 1:736
Data  0:144  0:055 1:000  0:040  0:008 1:000
Finland France
1929-32 1932-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:072 0:092 0:340  0:180 0:275 0:209
Government 0:050  0:025  0:153  0:015 0:031  0:002
Investment 0:052  0:036  0:115 0:081  0:155 0:176
Labor  0:168 0:162 0:928  0:117  0:144 0:617
Data  0:138 0:193 1:000  0:230 0:007 1:000
Germany Italy
1929-32 1932-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency 0:054  0:015  0:083  0:023 0:075 0:515
Government  0:069 0:185 0:465 0:032 0:089  0:463
Investment  0:009 0:078 0:166 0:075 0:031  0:865
Labor  0:217 0:039 0:452  0:199  0:212 1:813
Data  0:241 0:288 1:000  0:115  0:016 1:000
Netherlands Norway
1929-32 1932-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:085  0:114 0:675 0:059 0:028 0:490
Government 0:034  0:035 0:081 0:007  0:001  0:013
Investment  0:027 0:170  0:707 0:051 0:013  0:309
Labor  0:098  0:089 0:952  0:169 0:016 0:831
Data  0:177  0:068 1:000  0:052 0:055 1:000
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Spain Sweden
1929-32 1932-38 Cont 1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:060  0:907 1:677 0:012 0:034 0:100
Government 0:180 0:517  1:383  0:032 0:015 0:041
Investment  0:350 0:295  0:166  0:009 0:036 0:235
Labor 0:097  0:396 0:872  0:048 0:051 0:623
Data  0:134  0:491 1:000  0:078 0:137 1:000
UK
1929-32 1932-38 Cont
E¢ ciency  0:087  0:040 0:054
Government  0:018 0:023 0:209
Investment  0:001 0:050 0:263
Labor  0:006 0:071 0:475
Data  0:113 0:104 1:000
E Data Appendix
 Belgium
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Buyst, E.
(1997) New GNP Estimates for the Belgium Economy during the Interwar
PeriodReview of Income and Wealth, 43 (3), Table 3.
Employment : (Industrial employment without transportation sector):
Goosens, M. D. (1988), De Belgische Arbeidsmarkt Tijdens het Interbellum,
Tijdschrift voor Economie en Management, 33 (2), Table 1.
Hours: Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London,
Macmillan & Co. Ltd
Population, Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell,
B.R. (2013), International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edi-
tion, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5, H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Denmark:
GDP : Hansen, S. V. (1974), Okonomisk vaekst I Danmark, Bind II: 1914-
1970, Akademisk Forlag, Kobenhavn, Table 1, 4.
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Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Niels Kaergard
(1991), Okonomist Vaekst, Jurist-og Okonomforbundets Forlag, Table 2, 3.
Employment : Pedersen, P. J., (1974) Arbejdsstyrke og beskætigelse 1911-
70, Socialt Tidsskrift, Vol. 53 (2), pp. 31-56.
Hours: Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London,
Macmillan & Co. Ltd
Population, Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell,
B.R. (2013), International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edi-
tion, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5, H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Finland
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Employ-
ment, Population: Hjerppe, R. (1996): Finlands Historical National Ac-
counts 1860-1994: Calculation Methods and Statistical Tables, Jyvaskyla:
Suomen Historian Julkaisuja, via The Nordic Historical National Accounts
Database:
http://old.nhh.no/forskning/nnb/?selected=brows/xls
Hours: Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London,
Macmillan & Co. Ltd
Wholesale Prices, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), International
Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave Macmillan:
Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Money Wages: Singer-Kerel, J. (1961), Le cout de la vie a Paris de 1840
a 1954, Colin.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 France
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Employ-
ment : The CEPII web site:
http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/villa/mode.htm
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Hours: Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London,
Macmillan & Co. Ltd
Population, Wholesale Prices, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), In-
ternational Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5, H1, B4, G1-G3.
Money Wages: Singer-Kerel, J. (1961) Le cout de la vie a Paris de 1840
a 1954, Colin, pages 536-537.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Germany
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Ritschl,
A. (2002), Deutschlands Krise und Konjunktur. Binnenkonjunktur, Aus-
landsverschuldung und Reparationsproblem zwischen Dawes-Plan und Trans-
fersperre 1924-1934, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
Employment : Ho¤mann, W.G. (1965): Das Wachstum der deutschen
Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin: Springer Verlag,
Table 20.
Hours: Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London,
Macmillan & Co. Ltd
Population: Ho¤mann, W.G. (1965): DasWachstum der deutschenWirtschaft
seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, Berlin: Springer Verlag, Table 1.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2000, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Italy
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Population:
Ba¢ gi, A. (2011), Italian National Accounts, 1861-2011, Banca dItalia Eco-
nomic History Working Papers 18.
Employment : Constructed from labor force and unemployment data.
Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London, Macmillan
& Co. Ltd (for labor force, interpolated). Mitchell, B.R. (2013), Interna-
tional Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, Palgrave Macmillan: Bas-
ingstoke (for unemployment).
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Hours: Constructed from Zamangi, V. (1994), Una Riconstruzione dellAndamento
Mensile dei Salari Industriali e dellOcupacione 1919-39, in Ricerche per la
storia della Banca dItalia, Vol. 5, Bari: Laterza, pp. 348-378 and Rossi,
N., A. Sorgato and G. Toniolo (1993), I Conti Economici Italiani: una Ri-
construzione Statistica, 1880-1990, Rivista di Storia Economica, Vol. X, pp.
1-47.
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 The Netherlands
GDP : Smits ,J.P., Woltjer, P.J. andMa, D. (2009), A Dataset on Compar-
ative Historical National Accounts, ca. 1870-1950: A Time-Series Perspec-
tive, Groningen Growth and Development Centre Research Memorandum
GD-107, Groningen: University of Groningen.
Private Consumption: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2001): Twee-
honderd jaar statistiek in tijdreeksen, 1800-1999, Voorburg/Heerlen, 2001,
Table 9.
Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Groote, P., R. M. Albers and H.J. de
Jong (1996), A Standardised Time Series of the Stock of Fixed Capital in the
Netherlands, Groningen Growth and Development Centre Research Memo-
randum GD-25, pp.20.
Employment : Van Ark, B. and H. J. de Jong, (1996): Accounting for
Economic Growth in the Netherlands since 1913.Groningen Growth and
Development Centre Research Memorandum GD-107, Table A.1.
Hours: Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London,
Macmillan & Co. Ltd
Population, Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell,
B.R. (2013), International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edi-
tion, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5, H1, B4, G1-G3.




GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Population:
Grytten, O. H. (2004), The Gross Domestic Product for Norway, 1830-
2003., in: Eitrheim, Ø., Klovland, J. T.,Qvigstad, Jan F. eds. Historical
Monetary Statistics for Norway, Oslo: Norges Bank.
Employment : Clark, C. (1951): The Conditions of Economic Progress,
London, Macmillan & Co. Ltd, page 103.
Hours: Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London,
Macmillan & Co. Ltd
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Spain
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation: Prados de
la Escosura, L. (2003), El progreso económico de España, 1850-2000, Madrid:
Fundación BBVA, Appendix F, H.
Employment, Hours: Prados de la Escosura, L.: mimeo
Population, Wholesale Prices, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), In-
ternational Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2000, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table A5, H1, B4, G1-G3.
Money Wages: Maluquer de Motes, J., 1989, Precios, Salarios y Bene-
cios. La Distribucion Funcional de la Renta, in A. Carreras eds. Estadisticas
Historicas de Espana, S. XIX-XX, Fundacion Banco Exterior: Madrid, Table
12.14.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 Sweden
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Employ-
ment, Population: Krantz, O. and L. Schön (2007): Swedish Historical




Hours: Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London,
Macmillan & Co. Ltd
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 UK
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Employ-
ment, Population: Feinstein, C. H. (1972): National Income, Expenditure
and Output of the United Kingdom, 1855-1965, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, Table 5, 55, 59.
Hours: Clark, C., (1951), The Conditions of Economic Progress, London,
Macmillan & Co. Ltd
Wholesale Prices, Money Wages, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013),
International Historical Statistics: Europe, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave
Macmillan: Basingstoke, Table H1, B4, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
 US
GDP, Private Consumption, Gross Fixed Capital Formation, Employ-
ment : Kendrick, J. W. (1961): Productivity Trends in the United States,
Princeton University Press, Table A-IIa, A-VI.
Population, Hours, Money Wages: Carter, S., S. Gartner, M. Haines, A.
Olmstead, R. Sutch and G. Wright (2006): Historical Statistics of the United
States. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Table Aa6-8, Ba4592-4596,
Ba4396.
Wholesale Prices, Money Supply: Mitchell, B.R. (2013), International
Historical Statistics: Americas, 1750-2010, 5th edition, Palgrave Macmillan:
Basingstoke, Table H1, G1-G3.
Nominal Interest Rate: Historical Financial Statistics, International Pol-
icy Rates.
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